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In this article, I argue that Marx's philosophy does not commit us to Worrell and Krier's claim that a post-capitalist society will be a social formation in which all social relations appear unmediated to their agents. Quite the opposite is true: given his Hegelian background, which Marx never gives up, social relations are in principle to be mediated by the results of human productive acts, and although a socialist society no longer is mediated by capital, it still cannot be thought without a legal, ethical, and political form of these relations. Those meditations (which Worrell and Krier do not separate clearly from social-economic aspects) will be universal. Accordingly, the authors' claim that Marx is opposed to the concept of the universal is baseless. In addition, I demonstrate that Worrell and Krier's interpretation of Marx's concept of alienation as a romantic concept is misguided and, instead, that we would do well to focus on the concept of private property. Finally, I show that they do not properly grasp Marx's concepts of democracy and communism.

In this paper I argue that we should not accept the normative turn that major contemporary critical theorists, such as Habermas, Honneth, and Jaeggi, have introduced to critical theory. On the one hand, the introduction of a communicative and ultimately ethical paradigm led to a loss of a dialectical concept of society. On the other hand, this turn led to a loss of a non-normative concept of critique. Accordingly, I argue that we should return to a Marxian concept of critique as analysis of (capitalist) social totality, which, in turn, enables us to re-introduce a concept of society that is not based on abstract moral or normative assumptions, but, instead, functions as their basis. For only a non-normative concept of critique can help us to see the finite and historical limits of capitalist society. Moreover, this return to Marx not only helps us understand that capitalist social totality is not established on ethical grounds but that it is constituted by money and labor. As a consequence, the return to a Marxist paradigm allows critical theory to include an analysis of the natural basis of capitalist sociality, of which it has lost sight due to its ethical idealism.

"In this paper I argue that we should not accept the normative turn that major contemporary critical theorists, such as Habermas, Honneth, and Jaeggi, have introduced to critical theory. On the one hand, the introduction of a communicative and ultimately ethical paradigm led to a loss of a dialectical concept of society. On the other hand, this turn led to a loss of a non-normative concept of critique. Accordingly, I argue that we should return to a Marxian concept of critique as analysis of (capitalist) social totality, which, in turn, enables us to re-introduce a concept of society that is not based an abstract moral or normative assumptions, but, instead, functions as their basis. For only a non-normative concept of critique can help us to see the finite and historical limits of capitalist society. Moreover, this return to Marx not only helps us understand that capitalist social totality is not established an ethical grounds but that it is constituted by money and labor. As a consequence, the return to a Marxist paradigm allows critical theory to include an analysis of the natural basis of capitalist sociality, of which it has lost sight due to its ethical idealism." (author's abstract)

The thesis of my remarks is that Piketty's overall position understands capital as something that exists within society, whereas I submit (on the grounds of Marx's theory of society) that capital is the main category that determines the existence of capitalist society. Put differently, capital in the form of valorized labor determines the specific social form of capitalist society. Whereas Piketty's position is built upon a positivistic concept of capital, I argue that capital is not 'some-thing'; rather, capital is the central category of capitalist social reproduction. Capital, in other words, must describe the functioning of a social totality as a whole and cannot be related to a single aspect of it. Accordingly, though the focus on inequality is important, it tends to hide the real social organization of capitalist society.

In this essay I briefly analyze why the concept of class has disappeared in recent social philosophy, such as in the philosophies of Badiou, Negri/Hardt, and Honneth. I argue that a change in the foundations of their social ontologies has led to the dismissal of the concept of class and, in addition, I argue that these changes are unwarranted, since they lead to a loss of a critical concept of society. Then, in a second part, I argue that the concept of class deserves a systematic status within a theory of capitalist sociality, especially since the concept of class can be traced back genetically to violent social relations that are derived from the capitalist social order.

"In this essay I briefly analyze why the concept of class has disappeared in recent social philosophy, such as in the philosophies of Badiou, Negri/Hardt, and Honneth. I argue that a change in the foundations of their social ontologies has led to the dismissal of the concept of class and, in addition, I argue that these changes are unwarranted, since they lead to a loss of a critical concept of society. Then, in a second part, I argue that the concept of class deserves a systematic status within a theory of capitalist sociality, especially since the concept of class can be traced back genetically to violent social relations that are derived from the capitalist social order." (author's abstract)